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Abstract
Seasonal and temporary migration programs
are widely used around the world, yet there is
scant evidence as to their development impacts.
Absent such evidence, it is difficult to evaluate
whether the proliferation of temporary worker
programs in recent years is a useful develop-
ment. This article reviews studies that attempt
to measure impacts of seasonal and temporary
migration with a particular focus on evidence
from the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
Key words: circular migration, develop-
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1. Introduction
Restrictions on the international movement of
labour are the largest distortions in the world
economy, with estimated gains from the elimi-
nation of these barriers often in the range of
50–150 per cent of world gross domestic
product (Clemens 2011). These barriers make
increased migration likely the most effective
mechanism to rapidly increase incomes of
people from poor countries, since cross-border
price wedges for similar labour are up to 1000
per cent (Clemens et al. 2008). But the exis-
tence of these barriers also attests to the fact that
increased international migration is controver-
sial, with migrant-receiving countries worried
about the costs of assimilating workers and
their families, and migrant-sending countries
worrying about the permanent loss of talented
workers and the externalities they are presumed
to create. Temporary or circular migration pro-
grams are seen as a way of overcoming such
concerns and enabling poorer, less-skilled
workers to benefit from the higher incomes to
be earned abroad as part of a ‘triple-win’,
whereby migrants, the sending country, and the
receiving country all benefit.
Many migration arrangements can be
described as circular, repeat, seasonal or tem-
porary. While circularity is not built into all
programs, the time-limited contracts and the
limited opportunities in the home country
often mean that temporary workers go back
and forth repeatedly (Newland et al. 2008). A
range of skills are covered, from programs for
the temporary entry of highly skilled labour in
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specialised jobs (e.g. the H-1B visa in the
United States) to programs for the entry of low
skilled young women, such as those from
Indonesia and the Philippines who work as
maids and caregivers in Malaysia and Singa-
pore. Sectors of employment are typically
restricted, such as the migration of seasonal
workers from the Pacific Islands to work in the
horticultural sector in Australia and New
Zealand, and freedom of workers to move
between employers in the same sector is
usually limited. The duration of entry can vary
from a few months, such as for seasonal
workers in agriculture, tourism and some types
of construction, to several years. For example,
Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS)
issues temporary work visas for three years
that are renewable up to five years, and the
H-1B visa program in the United States allows
admission for up to six years. Programs also
vary in whether effective control of the border
gate is entirely with governments (certifica-
tion), whereby the employer has to convince
labour and immigration authorities that local
workers are not available versus programs
where the employer has some practical control
over migrant worker entry since the employer
just needs to attest that there is no adverse
effect on local workers and that the migrant
will be paid prevailing wages or better, with
checks made by labour authorities only in
cases of complaints (Martin 2007).
There are several hundred of these bilateral
temporal workers agreements worldwide, with
the number increasing rapidly in recent years.
Even a decade ago, it was noted that there were
over 170 bilateral agreements among just the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries (Newland et al. 2008),
with a similar number within Latin America
(IOM 2005). A continued rise in the migration
pressures underlying these sorts of temporary
worker agreements can be expected in future
in response to international wage gaps, rising
demand for labour-intensive services such as
nursing care, divergent trends in youth and
elderly populations in developed and develop-
ing countries, and catch up from the previously
‘everything but labour’ nature of globalisation
in the post-World War II era (Pritchett 2006).
This proliferation of temporary migration
programs is covered in a number of studies
that describe various migration programs and
processes. Recent reviews of this literature
include Constant et al. (2012), who discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of circular
migration and describe some characteristics of
circular migrants. These authors also discuss
examples from the historical record of the
perverse consequences of restricting circular
migration, which can lead to an increase in
overstaying. Contrary to common belief,
Constant et al. (2012) note that acquiring the
host country’s citizenship does not necessarily
immobilise immigrants; instead, by providing
freedom of re-entry it encourages outmi-
gration. A particular focus on Asia and the
Pacific is provided by Hugo (2009), who
reviews best practice in development-oriented
temporary migration programs. Two of the
most prominent recent seasonal migration pro-
grams in the region—New Zealand’s Recog-
nized Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme and
Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot
Scheme (PSWPS) are described by Ramasamy
et al. (2008) and Ball (2010), respectively.
The focus of the current review is somewhat
different. Instead of just describing various
migration programs and the characteristics of
the participants, we pay particular attention to
studies that attempt to measure impacts of sea-
sonal and temporary migration. The reason for
this particular focus is that without an under-
standing of impacts, it is impossible to judge
whether the expansion of temporary migration
programs is a positive development. That such
impact evaluations are just a small subset of
the broader migration literature has been noted
by previous reviews. According to Constant
et al. (2012, p. 2), ‘empirical evidence about
circular migration is scarce and empirical
analyses are limited due to missing or prob-
lematic data’. Moreover, until recently, the few
studies that did exist were based on ex post
surveys of migrants and lacked credible
counterfactuals for what would have happened
to households in the absence of migration (e.g.
Basok 2000). New studies that primarily have
been focused on recently introduced seasonal
worker programs in the Pacific and on the
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long-established phenomenon of Filipino tem-
porary migration help provide more rigorous
evidence as to the impacts.
This focus also means that we neces-
sarily cover an empirical literature because the
effects of migration—whether temporary or
permanent—on household welfare and broader
economic development in source communities
is a priori unclear. Migrant-sending house-
holds and their communities can benefit from
remitted and repatriated earnings, but the local
incomes and other household inputs that
migrants would have generated locally are
lost. It is therefore an empirical matter as to
whether the opportunity costs are outweighed
by the new income from abroad. Given the
enormous wage gains possible from migra-
tion, our prior should be that for the household
as a whole (including the migrant) these
opportunity costs should be far less than the
gain, but, especially with permanent migra-
tion, much of the gain may go to the migrant
with the remaining household members not
necessarily being better off. Moreover, there is
no reason that impacts in one context will nec-
essarily apply elsewhere since the selectivity
into the program and the opportunity costs of
temporary absence may vary quite widely
between countries.
An example of this specificity comes from
the differing impacts of two concessional
settlement migration schemes that New
Zealand has for the neighbouring Pacific coun-
tries of Samoa and Tonga. The short-run effect
of immigration to New Zealand from Tonga
under the Pacific Access Category is to reduce
consumption, diet quality, income and finan-
cial access and increase the poverty rate of the
left-behind members of the migrant’s house-
hold (Gibson et al. 2011).Yet in Samoa, migra-
tion through the similar but larger and longer
established Samoa Quota (SQ) appears to
reduce poverty among remaining members of
households sending SQ migrants, at least in
the medium term (Gibson et al. 2013). Both of
these concessional migration schemes are
oversubscribed, and so use a random ballot to
select among the applicants. Hence, the usual
selection biases, where households participat-
ing in international migration differ from
non-participants in unobservable ways (e.g.
ambition, motivation, talent), should not apply.
Instead, it appears to have been a difference
in intra-household selectivity into migration
in the two countries that mattered. Samoan
households relied relatively less on the labour
earnings of the potential migrants before
migration, whereas the Tongan movers had
been earning much more than average, and so
the remaining household members suffer a
larger opportunity cost of their absence in
terms of these foregone labour earnings, with
extra remittance income not being sufficient to
make this difference up, at least in the short
run. The longer run impact may differ and may
come through the opportunity for those left
behind to eventually reunite with the migrant
at destination.
This example from the Pacific shows the
potentially subtle nature of migration impacts.
In both cases, the use of a random ballot
greatly assisted with the careful empirical
evaluation, and some of the impacts would
have been missed if the common non-
experimental evaluation techniques typically
applied to observational data had been relied
upon. The impacts of temporary migration are
potentially even more complex, since this
involves both a temporary source of new
income and a temporary change in household
composition and the location of household
economic activities (the household becomes a
transnational unit with members in two coun-
tries). There are large literatures on the effects
of temporary income shocks on households
(e.g. Hall & Mishkin 1982), and also on the
effects of changes in household composition
on well-being (for example, Lang & Zagorsky
2001). But the joint effects of these two
changes, as occurs with the temporary migra-
tion of a household member to an overseas
labour market, and then the undoing of these
changes upon the worker’s return, is rarely
studied (Clemens & Tiongson 2012).
The remainder of the article is structured as
follows. Section 2 discusses views of develop-
ment impact and the factors which may influ-
ence this impact in the context of temporary
migration. Section 3 turns to the empirical
evidence, with attention paid especially to
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studies using quasi-experimental methods to
measure impacts of seasonal and temporary
migration on the households supplying
workers. In order to go from household-level
impacts to aggregate impacts, the size of
various seasonal and temporary migration pro-
grams must be considered. In Section 4, there
is a discussion of the debate in the literate
on ‘numbers versus rights’ which may help
provide some insight into the contrasting
experiences of the recently introduced sea-
sonal migration schemes of Australia and New
Zealand. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Framework for Thinking about
Development Impacts
In order to review the evidence on the devel-
opment impacts of seasonal and temporary
migration, some discussion of what is meant
by development impact is required. One view
is that development occurs only if there is a
long-term improvement in household welfare
and in the economic viability of local commu-
nities. This view is implied by the remarks
made by the New Zealand Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Winston Peters, at the time that New
Zealand’s RSE scheme was approved:1
First and foremost it will help alleviate poverty
directly by providing jobs for rural and outer
island workers who often lack income-generating
work. The earnings they send home will support
families, help pay for education and health, and
sometimes provide capital for those wanting to
start a small business.
A similar view is implied by the comment
of Barber et al. (2005) that, in the context of
one-shot schemes, a one-year migration
opportunity may be too short for migrants to
earn enough to set up a business or make other
meaningful investments at home. The threats
to development impact under this view are that
either too little of the income earned abroad
returns to the household because the migrant
consumes too much, the transactions costs of
running a transnational household are too
high, or that what money does return is
unwisely spent on things that may raise short-
term utility but leave the household no better
off in the long term. For example, claims by
Pessar (2005) that remittances and earnings of
lower skilled temporary migrants are usually
spent on conspicuous consumption, and non-
productive investment are consistent with
this pessimistic view that there is no develop-
ment impact from participating in temporary
migration.
However, this pessimistic view fails to
recognise that the characteristics of source
communities that make temporary labour
migration attractive relative to local options
may also mean that there is only limited scope
for productive investment. This is particularly
true in the Pacific Islands, where small market
sizes, long distances to other markets and
high transactions costs limit the scope for
business development, as noted in a recent
Pacific Futures report (World Bank 2011).
Instead, it may be that in such communities,
the best opportunity to bring about a long-term
improvement in well-being is by recurrent par-
ticipation in seasonal or temporary migration.
The appropriate research question then would
be whether the welfare consequences of long-
term and recurrent splitting of families out-
weigh the benefits of having workers access a
rich country labour market.
At least five factors likely matter to the
development impact of a temporary migration
program. These factors may vary between
countries, or even between communities
within a country, so development impacts
could differ even when workers from different
countries or communities carry out similar
tasks during their sojourn as guest workers in
the host country.
• Productivity: all else the same, development
impacts should be larger the more productive
the migrants are when engaged in temporary
work. Migrants from different counties may
have varying levels of productivity, even
for the same tasks in the host country, if
returnees are more productive than newcom-
ers and if the likelihood of return varies
(perhaps because other schemes are available
to some countries and not others, or variation
1. ‘Seasonal work policy benefits Pacific says Peters’,
Islands Business, 26 October 2006.
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in transactions costs affects net returns).
While no quantitative data have been pub-
lished, the qualitative evaluation of New Zea-
land’s RSE program found a majority of
employers reporting that second season
workers (many of whom were returnees) had
higher productivity than the first season
workforce, with less need for training com-
pared with their previous experience of a
constantly churning workforce (NZDoL
2010).
• Selectivity: the nature of development
impacts depends on which households are
selected to supply workers, particularly for
distributional concerns such as poverty.
For New Zealand’s RSE program, which
recruited workers from multiple countries,
the workers from Tonga were drawn from
the poorer parts of the income distribution,
so any positive household-level impacts
likely are pro-poor (Gibson et al. 2008), but
workers from Vanuatu were from richer than
average households (McKenzie et al. 2008).
This difference in selectivity may have re-
flected greater familiarity with international
migration in Tonga, whereas in Vanuatu the
poorest households lacked information about
the program in the first year and may lack
resources to finance the costs of the travel
process. Moreover, average levels of educa-
tion are considerably higher in Tonga, so if
employers looked for similarly educated
workers from both countries (because of a
need for certain levels of English compe-
tency) such workers are found higher up the
skills and income distribution in Vanuatu
than in Tonga.
• Opportunity costs: if the temporary migrant
had not become a guest worker they other-
wise would have been working in either
market or non-market production in the home
country. The nature of that production and the
reliance of their household on it (for example,
the differing intra-household selectivity in
Tonga and Samoa noted above) will influence
the development impacts of the worker’s
absence from the household. Returning to the
example of the RSE, less than 10 per cent of
the workers from Tonga had been in wage
employment prior to leaving for New
Zealand, while two fifths of the workers from
Vanuatu had been previously employed, so
the opportunity cost was likely greater for
participants from Vanuatu. This argument
also applies to non-market production; for
example, in Samoa workers selected into
the RSE were required by leaders of some
villages to plant extra Taro (Colocasia
esculenta) before leaving, so as to provide a
food source for their family while the worker
was absent (Gibson et al. 2013). It should
also be noted that in the case of wage employ-
ment, the opportunity cost to sending house-
holds (absent members no longer working in
wage employment) is likely to represent a
gain to individuals in different households
that are not participating in migration (but
who can now potentially be employed in
those wage jobs), although the literature to
date in Asia and the Pacific has not been able
to document the size of such spillovers.2
• Transactions costs: in order for the temporary
migrant to remain part of the life of their
household, they likely spend money on com-
munication and, potentially, transport if
home visits during the work period are per-
mitted. Moreover, they will typically be
remitting rather than just repatriating earn-
ings upon their return home, so money trans-
fer fees and exchange rate commissions add
to the costs facing a transnational household.
These transactions costs affect not only the
net return to the household from having a
member working abroad but also the time
profile of income, which may have welfare
consequences. For example, Gibson and
McKenzie (2013) report that workers in New
Zealand’s RSE scheme remitted or brought
back with them an average of NZ$5,500. For
Tongans, half was remitted and half repatri-
ated, but for workers from Vanuatu just 10
per cent was remitted and the rest repatriated
after the work period because of the limited
financial access and high transactions costs
of sending money. Perhaps as a consequence,
families of RSE workers from Vanuatu ate
2. See Mishra (2007) for evidence from Mexico that emi-
gration has increased wages for remaining workers in
sending regions.
Gibson et al.: Impacts of Temporary Migration 5
© 2013 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
less varied diets and suffered more health
complaints, while their worker was abroad on
the RSE, compared with similar households
who had not sent seasonal workers, but there
was no such effect on the left behind family of
RSE workers in Tonga (Rohorua et al. 2009).
• Absorptive capacity: any surplus that house-
holds make from participating in temporary
migration is available for investing in the
local economy. But whether it makes sense to
direct investment into localities which may
have a low density of economic activity, poor
infrastructure and high-transactions costs is
debatable. In many cases, the returns from
investment in mobile human capital (through
better schooling and nutrition) may make
more sense, since those returns are not tied to
activities in a particular geographic location,
especially for households who have already
shown a willingness to be internationally
mobile.
There is no study in the literature which has
provided credible empirical evidence on all
five of these factors so as to form an overall
picture of the development impacts of seasonal
or temporary migration. Most of the available
evidence is on selectivity, opportunity costs
and transactions costs, and knowledge of these
three factors does at least allow impacts at the
household level to be calculated.
3. Empirical Evidence
There are difficult challenges in attempting to
empirically estimate the development impacts
of any type of migration, even restricting
attention just to measuring household-level
impacts. As noted by McKenzie (2012, p. 2):
[M]igrants are special—they differ in some
combination of motivation, skills, wealth, drive,
ambition, risk preferences, access to networks,
entrepreneurial attitude, and a plethora of other
attributes from the rest of the population who
don’t migrate. . . . [consequently]. . . . compari-
sons of migrant and non-migrant households are
unlikely to be able to give convincing estimates
of the impacts of migration.
To overcome this challenge, researchers are
turning to experiments, where randomisation
is either from policy design (such as from the
U.S. Green Card lottery) or from researcher
design. The advantage of experiments is that
with full randomisation and full compliance,
the only reason one individual or household
engages in migration and another does not is
purely chance. Hence, the non-migrant house-
hold in this happy circumstance can serve as a
valid counterfactual for what may have hap-
pened to the household with migrants, in the
absence of migration. Such a counterfactual
allows researchers to make credible estimates
of the impacts of migration.
There is yet to be such ongoing experiments
with international seasonal or temporary
migration and in fact much of the published
empirical research on seasonal and temporary
migration falls well short of this experimental
standard.3 In fact, studies of seasonal and tem-
porary migrants often lack data on the family
left behind because they are fielded just in the
host country (e.g. Basok 2000; Tan & Gibson
2011). Even if fieldwork spans both source
and host counties, some studies are just of
households with seasonal migrants (e.g. Basok
2003), so there are no control groups to see
what might have happened to the household if
the worker had not migrated. Also, it is unusual
for these surveys to have baseline information
so as to control for pre-existing differences,
which might otherwise be wrongly attributed
to participation in the migration program.
However, some non-experimental studies
that are carefully conducted using quasi-
experimental methods may be more informa-
tive than much of the literature, and these
3. A researcher-designed experiment with in-country sea-
sonal migration conducted in Bangladesh is analysed by
Bryan et al. (2012). Beam et al. (2013) report on an experi-
ment designed to spur temporary migration from the
Philippines, highlighting the difficulties of unilateral
facilitation policies in getting workers to leave. Clemens
(2010) exploits a quirk in the administrative process for
granting H1-B temporary skilled-worker visas to the
United States in 2007 and 2008, which saw a limited
random ballot used to select which applications to process.
Clemens finds that workers from a multinational Indian
software company who randomly gained an H1-B visa and
then worked on-site with clients of that company in the
United States experienced almost a threefold increase in
real wages (measured in PPP dollars).
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are reviewed here, grouping them by the type of
approach used.
3.1 Regression-Discontinuity Studies
Clemens and Tiongson (2012) examine the
impact on households in the Philippines of
supplying workers under Korea’s Employ-
ment Permit System (EPS). These workers
are issued temporary visas to work in Korea
on job contracts that are for a sojourn of up
to three years, with no possibility for perma-
nent settlement. In keeping with other guest
worker programs, fairly narrow specifications
are sought which restrict the range of appli-
cants; in this case it is for 18–39 year olds,
with either high school or vocational qualifi-
cations and two years of work experience or a
tertiary degree and one year of work experi-
ence. Most of the work is in manufacturing
plants and in the sample used by Clemens
and Tiongson, over three quarters of the
applicants were males.
Even with these narrow specifications, the
majority of households in the Philippines with
members fitting these criteria do not supply
applicants to the EPS program. Therefore,
attempts to evaluate the impacts of supplying
an EPS worker face the problem that the self-
selected applicants may differ in unobservable
ways from members of groups used as a
counterfactual for what outcomes would have
been for these households had they not sup-
plied an EPS worker. To overcome this
problem, Clemens and Tiongson exploit the
fact that starting in 2005, all Filipino appli-
cants for EPS jobs had to take a 90-minute
examination that tested their basic listening
and reading in Korean, with a score of at least
120 points out of 200 needed to secure a work
permit. The households containing applicants
who scored just below this threshold are used
as a counterfactual for the households where
the EPS worker scored just above the thresh-
old. Specifically, they conducted a survey in
2010 of 899 households, who in the first five
rounds of testing between September 2005 and
May 2007 had a member who scored within
five points of the cut-off, with 460 households
having someone who failed the test and 439
having someone who exceeded the threshold.
With this sample, Clemens and Tiongson
are able to estimate impacts of participating in
the EPS guest worker program using a ‘regres-
sion discontinuity design’ which is a quasi-
experimental estimator that relies on the
presence of a threshold or cut-off that alters
behaviour. In this case, the EPS applicants
scoring just below 120 wanted to be guest
workers in Korea, had similar ability to those
who scored 120 or slightly more, but were
unable to migrate because of the binding
threshold. The households of these applicants
should provide a valid counterfactual in a
situation such as this temporary migration
program where randomisation is infeasible
because employers prefer not to have ran-
domly chosen workers. Compared with these
counterfactual households, the households
where a member worked in the EPS had higher
spending on health and education, were more
likely to put children into private school, bor-
rowed less from extended family, but did not
differ in terms of savings, labour supply of
the spouse or other family members, and
investing in entrepreneurial activities. Clemens
and Tiongson conclude that these households
were credit-constrained human capital inves-
tors who prioritise education and migration
over physical capital (entrepreneurship and
savings).
3.2 Matched Difference-in-Difference Studies
Gibson and McKenzie (2013) examine the
impact on households in Tonga and Vanuatu of
supplying workers under New Zealand’s RSE
scheme. These workers are issued a visa that
allows temporary migration for work in the
horticulture and viticulture industries for a
maximum of seven months in any 11-month
period, although in practice, most work con-
tracts are for six months or less. The workers
must be recruited by a recognised employer
(one whose ‘Application to Recruit’ was
approved by the New Zealand labour ministry)
who pays half of the return airfare, offers at
least 240 hours of work at market pay rates,
provides accommodation and pastoral care,
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and is required to pay the costs associated
with worker removal from New Zealand if
workers become illegal. The workers may be
re-employed in subsequent years, either with
the same or a new employer. Across the first
four years of the scheme, which began in April
2007, over half (54.4 per cent) of all RSE
workers returned at least once to work in
another season, while 23 per cent of workers
from the first season participated in all four
seasons (Merwood 2012).
Four waves of specially conducted surveys
fielded in Tonga and Vanuatu between 2007
and 2010 were used by Gibson and McKenzie
(2013) to estimate RSE impacts, with these
two countries chosen because they supplied
the largest number of RSE workers. The base-
line survey was fielded before workers had left
to work in New Zealand in the first season, and
then re-interviews were carried out 6, 12 and
24 months later. The RSE workers carry out a
variety of seasonal tasks that range from
pruning vines (both grape and kiwi fruit), to
picking citrus, grapes, kiwifruit, pip fruit and
stone fruit, and working in pack houses. The
recruitment is therefore spread throughout the
year since there is not one defined season that
workers are recruited for, and so the baseline
survey was fielded from October 2007 to April
2008. In each country, the sample was of
approximately 450 households, drawn from
about 50 communities, including households
supplying workers, households with applicants
who had not been recruited, and non-applicant
households.
Using these rich baseline data and knowl-
edge of how recruitment in each country
occurred (each Pacific country supplying
workers set its own approach to forming a
pool of applicants that employers could
recruit from), Gibson and McKenzie use a
‘propensity-score matching’ approach to iden-
tify households to act as comparison groups
for those households who supplied RSE
workers. The propensity score is the probabil-
ity of supplying a worker, which was modelled
as a function of demographic variables, char-
acteristics of the 18–50-year-old males in the
household (they are the group most likely to
participate), the household’s prior experience
and network in New Zealand, household base-
line assets and housing infrastructure, location,
and past household wage and salary history.
One variant of the propensity score further
restricted attention just to applicants, to poten-
tially screen on demand for the RSE (although
non-application was typically due to lack of
information so some non-applicants exhibit
characteristics quite close to those of appli-
cants). Attention was then restricted to house-
holds with propensity scores in the range of
0.1 to 0.9, to pre-screen the estimation sample
to just those households that were as similar
as possible prior to the RSE. The four waves
of data were then used to estimate panel
difference-in-differences and fixed-effects
regression models, where the difference-in-
differences method controls at the group level
for any baseline differences in outcomes
between the participants and the comparison
groups, while fixed effects controls for base-
line differences at the household level.
The results showed large positive effects on
the households ever supplying RSE workers.
In both Tonga and Vanuatu, the per capita
income of participating households rose by
over 30 per cent relative to the comparison
groups, while per-capita expenditure and
savings also rose. Subjective economic welfare
measured in the final wave survey increased by
almost half a standard deviation for partici-
pants in both countries who also purchased
more durable assets. In Tonga, RSE house-
holds also doubled the rate of home improve-
ment compared with the control group
households, and in both countries, participat-
ing households became more likely to have a
bank account, likely reflecting more formal
savings. In addition, there was some evidence
that in Tonga the school attendance rates for 16
to 18 year olds in participating households
increased.
One further aspect of the evaluation by
Gibson and McKenzie (2013) is that they went
beyond the impacts just on the participating
households and attempted to calculate macro
effects of the RSE on the supplying countries.
Specifically, per worker estimates of the
average impact of the program on household
income over the first two years were scaled up
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies •• 20138
© 2013 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
by the total number of worker–seasons sup-
plied by each country (this equals 3,590 for
Vanuatu and 1,971 for Tonga).4 These totals of
$NZ5.3 million in Tonga and $NZ9.7 million
in Vanuatu were equivalent to 42–47 per cent
of total annual bilateral aid from New Zealand
to these countries. Another way of viewing
these totals is that they were equivalent to
almost one half of annual export earnings for
Tonga and one quarter of annual export earn-
ings for Vanuatu. The econometric estimates
of the income gains to participating house-
holds were also cross-validated, by working
backwards from the reported median after-tax
earnings per season of NZ$12,000 for each
RSE worker.5 After deducting costs for accom-
modation, food, health insurance and contribu-
tion to airfares, a net return of approximately
NZ$5,500 per worker was available; spreading
this over the number of family members and
the number of repeat seasons and allowing for
the opportunity costs of the production that the
worker would otherwise have contributed in
the home country, gave an expected income
gain that accorded well with the econometri-
cally estimated income gain for participating
households.
3.3 Accounting Approaches
Gibson and McKenzie (2011) use a somewhat
similar ‘earnings accounting’ approach to esti-
mate the impacts on households in Tonga and
Kiribati of supplying workers in the first two
years of Australia’s PSWPS. Since only a
small number of workers had been recruited
for the PSWPS at the time, the samples avail-
able to be surveyed were too small to enable
the econometric procedure used in the estima-
tion of RSE impacts.6 Instead, these authors
combined data on the incomes earned in Aus-
tralia, the costs borne by the workers, and
remittances and repatriated earnings (from
surveys of the workers in Australia and surveys
of the returned workers and family in their
home communities), and the extant results
from the parallel analysis of the RSE program
to get a sense of the opportunity cost of par-
ticipation. Specifically, average after tax earn-
ings for a six-month season were estimated to
be in the range A$12,000–$13,000, which was
consistent with the minimum work hours guar-
anteed by the PSWPS and with prevailing
wages in Australia.7 Deducting weekly
expenses and the various set-up costs (clear-
ances and visas, transportation, work clothing)
left average net earnings of A$6,000 for the
Tongan workers and A$4,500 for the i-Kiribati
workers (who appeared to face higher costs).
This is the amount available to be either remit-
ted or repatriated when the worker returns, and
is consistent with the Tongan workers in the
first year of the PSWPS reporting that they
remitted an average of A$5,000. But the addi-
tional income available to the households sup-
plying the PSWPS workers is less than this,
since there is an opportunity cost of the fore-
gone income and household production that
the worker would have contributed had they
not migrated. Gibson and McKenzie (2011)
use the result from the RSE evaluation that the
true net gain is about 70 per cent of the amount
remitted or repatriated, and estimate that
households supplying PSWPS workers gained
approximately A$460 per capita, which was an
income increase of around 39 per cent.
An additional emphasis of the Gibson and
McKenzie (2011) study was on spatial target-
ing. All else the same, cost-minimising
4. A worker who participates in the RSE in one season
and who returns again the next season is counted as two
worker-seasons in the administrative data that were used to
calculate these totals.
5. Merwood (2012) uses administrative data from the
2007/2008 season through to the 2009/2010 season to
estimate median earnings for workers from Tonga and
Vanuatu that ranged from NZ$11,800 (for ni-Vanuatu
workers in 2009/2010) to $12,950 (for Tongans in 2007/
2008). The mean of these medians is $12,320, which
accords well with the survey estimates reported by Gibson
and McKenzie (2013).
6. A total of 89 workers were surveyed in Australia,
including 20 who were surveyed in both 2009 and 2010. A
total of 273 households were surveyed in Tonga, including
125 that were surveyed in each year. In Kiribati, there was
a single survey of 120 households.
7. In comparison with the RSE, wages are higher in Aus-
tralia, and the PSWPS guarantees a longer minimum work
period. But on the other hand, seasonal workers were taxed
at a higher rate in Australia, and they also appeared to face
higher costs for food, health insurance, transportation and
communication.
Gibson et al.: Impacts of Temporary Migration 9
© 2013 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
employers would prefer to hire workers from
the most convenient locations within supply-
ing countries, which may limit the geographic
spread of benefits from participating in sea-
sonal migration. Offsetting this, public policy
may attempt to distribute the benefits by man-
dating recruitment from more remote areas,
such as the Niuas (Niuafo’ou and Niuato-
putapu) and the Ha’apai group of islands in
Tonga. A particular challenge to spatial target-
ing in the Pacific is that extended family struc-
tures and flexible land use rights may allow
people to resettle in response to spatially
localised economic incentives. In other words,
there may be inflow of people from outside the
targeted areas who move in order to gain eli-
gibility. In fact, just over 40 per cent of the
Tongan workers surveyed had moved to facili-
tate recruitment into the PSWPS, with almost
one third of the movements being out from
the main islands in response to the perceived
greater odds of being recruited from the outer
islands.
4. Program Size and ‘Numbers
versus Rights’
The aggregate development impacts of sea-
sonal or temporary migration depend not only
on the size of per household impacts, which
are the main focus of the studies reviewed
above, but also on how large are the programs.
This point was explicitly noted by Gibson and
McKenzie (2011) in their calculation of the
benefits to Kiribati, Tonga and Vanuatu from
supplying workers to Australia’s PSWPS.
Even though the income gains for households
supplying to the PSWPS were the same order
of magnitude as for those supplying workers to
New Zealand’s RSE scheme (at between
30–40 per cent), the aggregate gains were only
three per cent of those for the RSE at that time
because of the very small scale of Australia’s
program. In terms of aggregate development
impacts, this issue of scale is of first-order
importance, compared with second-order
factors such as the nature of selection into the
scheme (that is, rich or poor households) and
the local absorptive capacity for investment of
any surplus that households make from partici-
pating in the scheme.
Given the importance of the scale of tempo-
rary migration programs in terms of both
understanding their overall welfare impacts, as
well as in the contribution that they make to
meeting the needs of employers abroad, it is
important to consider why the scale varies so
much across different programs. One key (and
provocative) explanation offered by two
experts on seasonal migration schemes, Martin
Ruhs and Philip Martin, is that there is an
inverse relationship between scale (the number
of migrants) and the rights given to low-skilled
migrant workers in high-income countries.
That is, countries with more low-skilled
migrant workers offer them relatively few
rights while those with fewer migrants typi-
cally provide more rights (Ruhs & Martin
2008, p. 249). This claimed relationship occurs
because more rights for migrants will mean
typically higher costs for employers, limiting
labour demand for migrants. The claimed
inverse relationship between migrant rights
and migrant numbers caused considerable
debate, with several studies claiming to refute
the relationship (Cummins & Rodriguez 2010;
UNDP 2010) although not always restricting
attention to just low-skilled or temporary
migrants.
Stronger evidence for a tradeoff between
rights and numbers comes from work by
McKenzie et al. (2013). They use a unique
database of all work contracts issued to Fili-
pino workers between 1992 and 2009 to
examine how the number of migrants going to
a destination country and the wages those
migrants are paid changes with business cycle
conditions at destination. They find a large sig-
nificant response of migrant numbers to
shocks at destination, but no significant wage
response, which they interpret as providing
evidence that binding minimum wages help
cause those who do migrate to be paid higher
wages, but mean that opportunities to migrate
are limited and that migrant numbers become
vulnerable to economic conditions abroad. A
case study of the impact of an increase in the
minimum wage paid to domestic workers
offers further support to this interpretation:
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doubling the minimum wage paid to Filipina
migrants lead to a 55 per cent reduction in
employment of Filipina domestic workers.
If an expanded definition of ‘rights’ is used,
then this relationship provides one way to view
the contrasting experiences of the recently
introduced seasonal migration schemes of
Australia and New Zealand. Workers under
both schemes had similar legal rights, but the
two schemes differ in the ‘right’ they gave a
seasonal worker to expect to make an eco-
nomic surplus from their participation in sea-
sonal work. The New Zealand RSE scheme
stipulates that employers have to provide a
minimum of just 240 hours of work at the
prevailing hourly wage rate or higher. Conse-
quently, many participants in the RSE work for
much shorter spells than the seven-month
maximum allowed by the scheme; in the
surveys used by Gibson and McKenzie (2013),
approximately one quarter of workers reported
spells of four months or less, and a few
workers had spells that were as short as two
months. It is possible that these short spells
did not generate an economic surplus for the
worker and their household. In contrast, in its
initial phase, the Australian pilot scheme guar-
anteed a minimum of six months of work at 30
hours per week, which was eventually revised
to five months at 35 hours per week or four
months at 38 hours per week.
One way to characterise this difference
between the two schemes is that the RSE pro-
vides an opportunity for workers to earn an
income, but there is no guarantee that they will
make an economic surplus from their partici-
pation.8 In contrast, the much higher minimum
work threshold for the Australian PSWPS pro-
vided more of a guarantee of making a surplus.
Of course this higher minimum work threshold
for Australia’s scheme makes it less flexible
and therefore potentially more expensive for
employers, which may limit labour demand for
seasonal workers coming under this scheme.
In addition to the longer minimum work
guarantee, several other differences between
the two schemes are likely to have made the
PSWPS relatively more expensive for employ-
ers in Australia compared to the RSE for
employers in New Zealand (Hay & Howes
2012). Initially, approved employers had to be
labour-hire companies rather than growers,
while the RSE was agnostic as to whether
growers or contractors employed workers.
Another source of relatively higher costs was
red tape and compliance; while not easily quan-
tified this was noted as a deterrent by many
employers interviewed by Hay and Howes
(2012), especially the market testing for
whether local labour was available. The small
size of the PSWPS also contributed to higher
costs in two ways; many employers were
simply unaware of the scheme so there was an
information cost, and because it was just a pilot
with no assurance that it would continue there
was risk for employers investing in it. Perhaps
the most important factor in making PSWPS a
relatively costly source of labour compared
with the RSE is the much greater reliance on
backpackers by the Australian horticultural
industry. The final factor considered by Hay
and Howes (2012) is that seasonal work in
Australia may not be attractive to Pacific
workers because of unfavourable tax rules and
remittance costs, compared with the situation
in New Zealand—although they consider the
labour demand side explanations far more
important than any supply side explanations.
Some evidence on this last point is available
from a survey of village leaders in Tonga that
we conducted in 2012, so as to obtain infor-
mation on the participation in Australia’s and
New Zealand’s seasonal work schemes by
households in their village. The respondents
were typically town officers or church minis-
ters, and in many cases, the screening of appli-
cants for forming a ‘work-ready’ pool had
been carried out by these leaders, so they were
well informed about the programs and their
prevalence in their villages. We also asked
these leaders to offer their opinion on which
country workers from their village preferred to
do seasonal work in, as a way of better under-
standing the supply side of the market from the
country that has been the largest supplier of
workers to Australia’s scheme and the second
largest supplier to New Zealand’s scheme.
8. We are grateful to John Roseveare, one of the lead
implementers of the RSE, for this terminology.
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Before reporting the results, it is helpful to
recall the scale of these two schemes. For the
first three years of Australia’s PSWPS (from
2007/2008 to 2010/2011), annual recruitment
averaged just 172 workers, while at the same
time New Zealand’s RSE scheme was recruit-
ing over 7,200 workers per year (Hay &
Howes 2012). While there was an expansion in
the final year of the Australian pilot, with
approximately one thousand workers hired, the
overall PSWPS recruitment was still much less
than had been predicted at the design stage,
with just 1,534 of 2,500 visas available being
issued.9 Since the PSWPS was just a pilot
while the RSE was fully operational, this com-
parison of the numbers recruited may seem
unfair, except for the fact that the RSE had
been operational for only one year prior to the
start of the pilot of Australia’s scheme and was
created fully fledged rather than with a four-
year, small-scale pilot. So the question remains
of why a relatively large seasonal work scheme
quickly got off the ground in one country but
not another, despite targeting similar workers
and the same industry (Hay & Howes 2012).
The survey results are reported in Table 1
for the 78 village leaders who participated.
These leaders were drawn from 40 different
villages, with just over three quarters on
Tongatapu and the remainder from Vava’u and
’Eua. There was a clear preference for work-
ing in Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program
(Table 1). Specifically, 41 per cent of the
leaders indicating that workers from their
village preferred to be recruited into this
scheme versus only 20 per cent indicating a
preference by their villagers for New Zea-
land’s RSE scheme (and 39 per cent felt that
workers were indifferent between the two
schemes). This difference in stated preferences
is statistically significant at the P  0.02 level
(t = 2.44). Australia’s scheme was favoured
entirely for economic reasons, with factors
such as the higher incomes and better returns,
and stronger value of the Australian dollar
mentioned. Moreover, among the leaders who
felt that New Zealand was a preferred choice
for workers from their village, the stated
reasons were all variants of the fact that they
had not yet had an opportunity to participate in
Australia’s program, with the New Zealand
program preferred just because it was the only
one available to them to date.
All of the surveyed villages had at least some
households who had ever participated in the
RSE, with a minimum of eight participating
households and a maximum of 68. However,
in 11 of the 40 villages, there had not yet been
any recruitment of workers into Australia’s
pilot scheme or its replacement. Relating these
participation numbers to the total number of
households in each village, it is apparent that
just over one fifth of all households had some-
time or other experienced RSE seasonal work
in New Zealand versus just 2.7 per cent
of households with experience in Australia
(Table 1). Since the RSE has been operating for
longer than the Australian schemes, this ‘stock’
measure of participation may be misleading, so
the final row of Table 1 provides a ‘flow’
measure of the average percentage of house-
holds in each village supplying workers to each
9. At the end of the pilot scheme, Australia set up the
Seasonal Worker Program (SWP), to run from 1 July 2012
to 30 June 2016. The SWP will allow 12,000 places over
that period (so an average of 3,000) per year. Of these,
10,450 are allocated to the horticultural sector, so this will
still be just one third the size of the RSE.
Table 1 Experience of and Preference for Seasonal
Work in Australia and New Zealand
Australia New Zealand
Per cent indicating this
country as the preferred
choice of seasonal workers
from their village†
41.3 (5.7) 20.0 (4.6)
Per cent of households in the
village who ever had
members participate in
seasonal work from this
country
2.7 (0.4) 20.8 (2.2)
Per cent of households in the
village with members
participating within the
last 12 months in seasonal
work from this country
1.6 (0.3) 6.7 (1.2)
Source: Author’s survey of 78 leaders in 40 villages in
Tonga in 2012.
Standard errors in ( ).
†Thirty-nine per cent of respondents reported that
preferences for working in Australia and New Zealand
were the same.
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scheme in the previous 12 months—this also
shows that the New Zealand program was
recruiting approximately four times as many
workers as Australia’s program in these areas.
This analysis shows clearly that the small
size and slow growth of Australia’s seasonal
work program does not reflect constraints
from the worker supply side. If anything, the
Australian scheme is more popular than the
RSE for those workers who can access both
schemes. Therefore, the reasons for the small
size of the Australian seasonal work program
must lie with some of the demand-side expla-
nations provided by Hay and Howes (2012).
5. Conclusions
Seasonal and temporary migration is widely
discussed, appears to be increasing—at least in
terms of the growth in the number of agree-
ments between countries if not in terms of
the number of workers—but is only rarely
analysed using empirically credible methods.
The challenges to credible evaluation come
from the self-selection into migration of both
households and workers within households,
and from the difficulty of measuring the effects
of temporary income changes and temporary
changes in household structure and the loca-
tion of economic activities. The studies
reviewed here suggest that seasonal and tem-
porary migration can have large development
impacts, at least on the households supplying
workers. While such effects can be added up to
produce national totals, the overall develop-
ment impacts may differ from the sum of these
household-level impacts. It remains a task for
future research to adequately measure these
aggregate level development impacts.
October 2013.
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